Case Blog
– State v. Carufel –
SCt
On three different occasions in
December 2004 and January 2005, Ricky J. Carufel sold cocaine to confidential
reliable informants (CRIs) at his residence in the City of
park. In this not-so-riveting case of State
v. Carufel, the Supreme Court interpreted Minnesota Stat. § 152.01, Subd. 12a,
which defines “park zone” as used in the drug crime statutes.
Carufel was charged with offenses
in three separate complaints filed in April 2005. Each complaint alleged one count of
third-degree controlled
substance crime in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.023, Subd. 1(1)
(prohibiting sale of cocaine), and one count of second-degree controlled
substance crime in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.022, Subd. 1(6)(i) (elevating
the degree of the crime for selling cocaine in a park zone). The district court granted the State’s motion
to join the three complaints for trial.
At trial, the State presented testimony describing the three controlled substance
transactions that took place at Carufel’s residence. Both an investigator and a police officer
testified that Carufel’s residence was within one block of the public
park. Additionally, the superintendent
of parks and forestry for the City of
testified that Carufel’s residence is 330 feet from the park and within one
city block of the boundary of the park.
Carufel moved to dismiss the second-degree controlled
substance charges after the close of the State’s case, arguing that the State
failed to prove that the sales had occurred in a “park zone,” under Minn. Stat.
§ 152.01, Subd. 12(a), which states that a “park zone” includes the park itself
and “the area within 300 feet or one city block, whichever distance is greater,
of the park boundary.” Carufel’s motion
was denied.
During jury deliberations, the jurors sent the court a
note requesting the legal definition of “one city block.” The court informed the jury that
contain any definition of “one city block” and it was a question of fact for
the jury to decide. The jury subsequently
found Carufel guilty on all six counts.
The district court imposed concurrent sentences on the second-degree
controlled substance convictions. The
district court did not deliver judgment or sentence Carufel on the third-degree
controlled substance charges in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 609.04
(2008) (prohibiting conviction for lesser-included offenses).
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s
decision to join the cases for purposes of trial. However, it reversed Carufel’s second-degree
controlled substance convictions on the ground that the controlled buys did not
occur within a park zone and remanded for adjudication and sentencing on the
third-degree controlled substance offenses.
The Supreme Court granted review solely on the issue of whether the controlled substance sale
occurred within a park zone within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 152.01, Subd.
12a, which provides:
“Park zone” means an area
designated as a public park by the federal government, the state, a local unit
of government, a park district board, or a park and recreation board in a city
of the first class. “Park zone” includes
the area within 300 feet or one city block, whichever distance is greater, of
the park boundary.
The parties agreed that Carufel’s
residence is more than 300 feet from the boundary of the park. Thus, the question was whether Carufel’s
residence is within a “park zone” on the alternative ground that it is located in
“the area within . . . one city block” of the boundary of the park.
Carufel argued his interpretation of the phrase
“one city block,” claiming that a park zone extends only to the side of the
block directly across the street from the park, and the two sides of the block
that run perpendicular to the park. The Supreme Court rejected Carufel’s this
argument stating that Carufel ignored the “area within” language of Minn.
Stat. § 152.01, Subd. 12a.
The Supreme Court said that Subd. 12a does not explicitly
limit or modify the phrase “the area within . . . one city block . . . of the
park boundary” in any way. Furthermore,
the Court said that if the legislature intended to limit the meaning of “the
area within . . . one city block . . . of the park boundary” to mean something
less than all the land within a block directly adjacent to the park, the
legislature could have done so with words like “block front,” “block face,” or
“block portion,” which it did not do.
The Court said it could not add words to a statute not supplied by the
legislature.
After a lot of unintelligible “block this, block that”
talk, the Court finally settled on the definition of park zone: “when the land
surrounding a public park is an area divided into rectangular blocks bounded by
city streets on all four sides [. . .] the park zone includes the entire area of a
block that is directly adjacent to the park”. This interpretation led to the result of Carufel’s
being located within a “park zone” as defined by Minn.
Stat. § 152.01, Subd. 12a.. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals and reinstated Carufel’s second-degree controlled
substance convictions.
Please remember that the interpretation
and analysis presented here is not intended to be legal advice. If you
are seeking legal advice please contact us for a free consultation and actual
examination the issues that your case may present.
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STATE OF
IN SUPREME COURT
A07-1711
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Court of Appeals |
Dietzen, J. |
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Concurring, Page, J. |
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Concurring, Anderson, Paul H., |
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State of |
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Appellant, |
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vs. |
Filed: April 29, 2010 |
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Office of Appellate Courts |
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Ricky J. Carufel, |
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Respondent. |
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________________________
Lori
Swanson, Attorney General,
Charles
E. MacLean, Winona County Attorney, Kevin P. O’Laughlin, Justin A. Wesley,
Assistant Winona County Attorneys, Winona, Minnesota, for appellant.
David W.
Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant State
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.
________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. Under
(2008), a park zone includes the area within one city block of the park
boundary. When the land surrounding a
public park is an area divided into rectangular blocks bounded by city streets
on all four sides, the phrase “the area within . . . one city block . . . of
the park boundary” in subdivision 12a is not ambiguous and the park zone includes
the entire area of a block that is directly adjacent to the park.
2. The evidence was sufficient to support
respondent’s convictions for second-degree controlled substance crimes.
Reversed.
O P I N I O N
DIETZEN, Justice.
Ricky
J. Carufel was found guilty of three counts of third-degree controlled
substance crime in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 1(1) (2008)
(prohibiting the sale of cocaine), and three counts of second-degree controlled
substance crime in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 1(6)(i) (2008)
(prohibiting the sale of cocaine in a park zone). The district court entered judgments of
conviction and sentences for the second-degree controlled substance crimes, and
did not adjudicate the third-degree controlled substance crimes because they
were lesser-included offenses. Carufel
challenged the convictions and sentences on the ground that the offenses did
not occur within a “park zone” as defined by statute. The court of appeals agreed and reversed
Carufel’s second-degree controlled substance convictions, and remanded for
adjudication and sentencing on the third-degree controlled substance
offenses. We granted review and reverse
the court of appeals and reinstate Carufel’s second-degree controlled substance
convictions.
In December 2004
and January 2005,
with confidential reliable informants (CRIs) to arrange for the purchase of controlled
substances in the
area. On December 27, 2004, a police investigator,
as part of a controlled buy, searched a CRI, and then provided the CRI with buy
money and a small digital recorder. The
investigator followed the CRI to Carufel’s residence at
The digital recording device successfully recorded a controlled buy from
Carufel at his residence.
Subsequently, the
investigator arranged two additional controlled buys on December 29, 2004, and
January 6, 2005, which were conducted in substantially the same manner, but
with an additional CRI and with an additional police officer assisting. Both of the sales were conducted at Carufel’s
residence. The substances purchased during
all three controlled buys later tested positive for cocaine.
Carufel was
charged with offenses in three separate complaints filed in April 2005. Specifically, each complaint alleged one
count of third-degree controlled substance crime in violation of Minn. Stat. §
152.023, subd. 1(1) (prohibiting the sale of cocaine), and one count of
second-degree controlled substance crime in a park zone in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 152.022, subd. 1(6)(i) (elevating the degree of the crime for selling
cocaine in a park zone), arising out of the controlled buys conducted on
December 27, 2004, December 29, 2004, and January 6, 2005. Carufel pleaded not guilty, and the district
court granted the State’s motion to join the three complaints for trial.
At trial, the
State presented testimony describing the three controlled buys at the Carufel residence. The CRIs testified that Carufel sold them
cocaine at his residence on the dates in question. Both the investigator and the police officer testified
that Carufel’s residence was within one block of
area surrounding Carufel’s residence, which depicted a residential area divided
into rectangular blocks bounded on all four sides by city streets. The diagram was admitted into evidence for
illustrative purposes.
The
superintendent of parks and forestry for the City of Winona testified that the
city has designated Gabrych Park as a public park, and that the park is bounded
on the north side by 6th Street, on the west side by Steuben Street, on the
south side by 7th Street, and on the east side by Buchanan Street. Carufel’s residence is located near the
northeast corner of
and
on the block immediately east of
by 6th Street, on the west side by Buchanan Street, on the south side by 7th
Street, and on the east side by Adams Street.
The superintendent concluded that Carufel’s residence is 330 feet from
boundary of the park. On
cross-examination, he agreed that “[t]o get from
to 307, you would go one block and turn right and go two houses.”
After the close
of the State’s case, Carufel moved to dismiss the second-degree controlled
substance charges arguing that the State failed to prove that the sales had
occurred in a “park zone,” which under Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12(a),
includes the park and “the area within 300 feet or one city block, whichever
distance is greater, of the park boundary.”
Carufel relied on Fuller’s testimony that Carufel’s residence was 330
feet from
to Carufel’s residence a person would need to walk one block and then turn and
then go two or three houses, depending on the route. The district court denied Carufel’s motion.
During the jury
deliberations, the jurors sent the court a note asking, “What is the legal
definition of ‘one city block?’ ” After consulting with the parties,
the court informed the jury that Minnesota law contains no definition of “one
city block” and that it was a question of fact for the jury to decide. The jury found Carufel guilty on all six
counts. The district court imposed
concurrent sentences of 48 months, 54 months, and 54 months on the
second-degree controlled substance convictions.
Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (2008) (prohibiting conviction for
lesser-included offenses), the district court did not adjudicate or sentence
Carufel on the third-degree controlled substance crimes.
The court of
appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to join the cases for trial,
reversed Carufel’s second-degree controlled substance convictions on the ground
that the controlled buys did not occur within a park zone, and remanded for
adjudication and sentencing on the third-degree controlled substance
offenses. State v. Carufel, No. A07‑1711, 2008 WL 5396714, at *4-*5 (
2008).
We granted review solely on the issue of whether the controlled buys
occurred within a park zone.
I.
The State claims
the court of appeals misconstrued Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a, when it concluded
that the controlled buys did not occur within a park zone, and therefore Carufel’s
convictions for second-degree controlled substance crimes should be
reinstated. Carufel contends that the court
of appeals properly construed subdivision 12a, and accordingly the decision of
the court of appeals should be affirmed.
Statutory
construction presents a question of law that we review de novo. State
v. Al-Naseer, 734 N.W.2d 679, 683 (
2007); State v. Stevenson, 656 N.W.2d
235, 238 (
2003). The goal of all statutory
construction is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the
legislature.”
determine whether the statute’s language on its face is clear and
unambiguous. Al-Naseer, 734 N.W.2d at 684.
In doing so, we assign the words of a statute their plain and ordinary
meaning. See
Stat. § 645.08 (2008). When analyzing the plain and ordinary meaning of words or
phrases, we have considered dictionary definitions. State v.
Hartmann, 700 N.W.2d 449,
453-54 (Minn. 2005). If the language of the statute is not
ambiguous, then we must apply its plain meaning. Al-Naseer,
734 N.W.2d at 684; State v. Maurstad,
733 N.W.2d 141, 148 (
2007). A statute is ambiguous if the
language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Am.
Family Ins. Group v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (
When a criminal statute is ambiguous, courts should construe the statute
narrowly in favor of lenity. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d at 148. But such construction does not require “the
narrowest possible interpretation to the statute.” State
v. Zacher, 504 N.W.2d 468, 473 (
1993).
Minnesota
Statutes chapter 152 sets forth, among other things, different degrees of offenses
for the sale of controlled substances.
For example, if a person unlawfully sells any amount of cocaine, that
person is guilty of a third-degree controlled substance crime. Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 1(1). Upon conviction, the penalty may be imprisonment
of not more than 20 years, or a fine of not more than $250,000, or both. Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 3(a)
(2008).
In 1989, the
legislature added “school zone” and “park zone” to chapter 152 of the criminal
code, Act of June 1, 1989, ch. 290, art. 3, §§ 4-5, 1989 Minn. Laws 1595,
1595–96 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subds. 12a, 14a (2008)), and
established elevated penalties for selling drugs in those zones.
(codified at Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 1(6) (2008)). Thus, if the sale occurs in a “school zone”
or a “park zone,”[1]
a person is guilty of a second-degree controlled substance crime. Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 1(6)(i). Upon conviction, the penalty may be
imprisonment of not more than 25 years, or a fine of not more than $500,000, or
both. Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 3(a)
(2008). The purpose of the statutes is
to enhance the penalty for those who sell drugs in a “school zone” or “park
zone” in an effort to protect children from the dangers associated with illegal
drug use. See State v. Benniefield, 678 N.W.2d 42, 47 (
those involved in illegal drug use . . . could bring the dangers associated
with illegal drugs into school [or park] zones.
For example, abandoned drugs or discarded drug paraphernalia might be found
in or around areas of drug use.”).
At issue is
whether the controlled buys took place in a “park zone” within the meaning of
Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a, which provides:
“Park zone” means an area
designated as a public park by the federal government, the state, a local unit
of government, a park district board, or a park and recreation board in a city
of the first class. “Park zone” includes
the area within 300 feet or one city block, whichever distance is greater, of
the park boundary.
It
is undisputed that
public park, and therefore qualifies as a “park zone” under subdivision
12a. Further, the parties agree that Carufel’s
residence is more than 300 feet from the boundary of
residence is within a “park zone” on the alternative ground that it is located in
“the area within . . . one city block” of the boundary of
Initially,
Carufel asserts that the term “one city block” is ambiguous because it is not
defined in the statute. To support his
assertion, Carufel relies on State v.
Estrella, 700 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Minn. App. 2005). In Estrella,
the court of appeals rejected a claim that the term “one city block” applied to
a parcel of undivided land that was at least 3075 feet by 2050 feet.
actual grid system is present, the term ‘one city block’ does not apply” and
therefore the within-300-feet provision controls.
dicta, the court of appeals stated that the statute was “ambiguous in its
definition of how far from the actual park boundary a ‘park zone’ extends”
because the plain language of the statute did not provide an exact definition
of the term “one city block.”
at 500. Unlike Estrella, the land adjacent to
is divided into rectangular residential blocks.
Because city block dimensions vary from city to city, the exact
dimensions of any particular park zone will depend on the size of the grid
system surrounding the park. Variations
in the dimensions of a city block adjacent to a particular park from city to
city, however, do not make the statutory language ambiguous because the boundaries
of the “park area” are ascertainable.
Thus, Estrella is not
persuasive authority that the phrase “one city block” is ambiguous when applied
to the facts of this case.
The State
contends that when the land adjacent to a park is divided into rectangular
blocks, the phrase “the area within . . . one city block” in subdivision 12a is
plain and unambiguous. Citing The American Heritage Dictionary 149
(New College Ed. 1980), the State notes that a “block” is commonly defined as a
“rectangular section of a city or town bounded on each side by consecutive
streets.” See also Black’s Law
Dictionary 194 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “block” to include “[a] municipal
area enclosed by streets”). Carufel
urges us to interpret the “one city block” language of subdivision 12a to mean
“the section of
[that is] between Buchanan and Adams streets.”
According to Carufel, the statement “I’m one block from the park” means
the length of one side of a block.
Carufel argues that the “whichever distance is greater” language of
Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a, supports his interpretation of the
“one city block” language. Based on his
interpretation of the phrase “one city block,” Carufel argues that a park zone extends
only to the side of the block directly across the street from the park, and the
two sides of the block that run perpendicular to the park.
Subdivision
12a sets forth two methods for determining the area of a “park zone” in a
particular case, and provides that the method using the greater distance from
the park boundary to calculate the area shall be applicable. First, the “park zone” includes the area
within 300 feet of the park boundary. Based
upon this method, the park zone includes a perimeter area bounded by sides
extending 300 feet from the park boundaries in all directions. Second, the “park zone” includes the area
within one city block of the park boundary.
Pursuant to the second method, the park zone includes the area bounded
by the consecutive streets surrounding the city blocks directly adjacent to the
public park.[2]
This is consistent with the commonly
understood definition of block as a rectangular section of a city or town
bounded on each side by consecutive streets.[3]
We reject Carufel’s argument that a park zone
is limited to the side of the block directly across the street from a park, and
the two sides of the block that run perpendicular to a park. The flaw in Carufel’s park zone argument is
that Carufel ignores the “area within” language of Minn.
Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a. [4]
We observe that subdivision
12a does not explicitly limit or modify the phrase “the area within . . . one
city block . . . of the park boundary” in any way. Had the legislature intended to limit the
meaning of “the area within . . . one city block . . . of the park boundary” to
mean something less than all the land within a block directly adjacent to the
park, the legislature could have done so with words like “block front,” “block
face,” or “block portion.” But the
legislature did not do so, and the court cannot add words to a statute not
supplied by the legislature. Wallace v. Comm’r of Taxation, 289
N.W.2d 588, 594 (1971).
We conclude that
when the land surrounding a public park is an area divided into rectangular
blocks bounded by city streets on all four sides, the phrase “the area within
. . . one city block . . . of the park boundary” in Minn. Stat. §
152.01, subd. 12a, is not ambiguous and the park zone includes the entire area
of a block that is directly adjacent to the park. Our reading of the statutory language is
consistent with the purpose of the statute—protecting children from the dangers
associated with illegal drug use by creating a buffer zone around parks.
Carufel’s house
is located on the western side of
Street
Although Carufel’s house faces
Street
adjacent to the
house is located within a “park zone” as plainly defined by Minn.
Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a.
II.
Carufel
argues that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to support his
second-degree controlled substance convictions because during cross-examination
the park superintendent confirmed that “[t]o get from
to 307, you would go one block and turn right and go two houses.”
“Where there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, our review on appeal is limited to a painstaking analysis of the
record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable
to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict
which they did.” State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (
“The weight and credibility of the testimony of individual witnesses is
for the jury to determine.” State v.
438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (
1989).
Two police officers testified that Carufel’s residence
was within “one city block” of
the area surrounding Carufel’s residence, reflecting a residential area divided
into rectangular blocks bounded on all four sides by city streets around the
location of
illustrative purposes. Additionally, the
park superintendent testified that Carufel’s residence was within one block of
We conclude that viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, this
testimony was sufficient to prove that Carufel’s residence was within the park
zone surrounding
The
court of appeals incorrectly focused on the park superintendent’s
cross-examination to determine the drug sales did not occur within “one city
block” of
“one city block” was not—“one city block plus a right turn and two houses or
one city block plus a left turn and three houses.” Carufel,
2008 WL 5396714, at *3. But when the evidence is viewed
in the light most favorable to the conviction, the jury could reasonably construe
the park superintendent’s cross-examination testimony as meaning “you would go
one block and turn right [on the same
block] and go two houses,” which was still in the “park zone” because it
was inside the “area within . . . one city block” of the park boundary. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals
and reinstate Carufel’s second-degree controlled substance convictions.
Reversed.
C O N C U R R E N C E
PAGE, Justice (concurring).
I concur in the
result only.
C O N C U R R E N C E
ANDERSON, Paul H., Justice (concurring).
I concur in the
result reached by the majority but disagree with how the majority interprets
and applies Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a (2008)—the statute that defines
“park zone.” Minnesota Statutes §
152.01, subd. 12a, provides that a park zone “includes the area within 300 feet or one city block, whichever distance is greater, of the park
boundary.” (Emphasis added.) In my view, the use of the term “city block”
in the statute unambiguously refers to a numerical measure of a distance equal
to a linear segment of a street bounded by consecutive cross streets.
I reach this
result because the key concept in the statute is one of distance, not area. While the statute does include the concept of
area, it is from a linear measurement of distance—“one city block”—that the
area included in a park zone is determined.
Because I conclude that there is no concept of area in the statute other
than the area that is ascertained by using the distance of “one city block,” my
interpretation and application of Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a, is at odds
with that of the majority. More
specifically, I conclude that once we determine that “one city block” is a linear
measurement of distance and then decide how that distance is determined, we
need say no more. This is so because
after making these two decisions, we have a sufficient basis to determine the
area of the park zone and whether Carufel was selling drugs within this
zone.
Minnesota
Statutes § 152.01, subd. 12a, provides that a park zone is delimited by
measuring “300 feet” or “one city block” from a park boundary, “whichever distance is greater.” (Emphasis added.) I conclude that both “300 feet” and “one city
block” as used in the statute, are measures of “distance” that are used to
ascertain the “area” of a park zone.
Both “300 feet” and “one city block” should be treated consistently. It cannot be disputed that “300 feet” is a
measure of distance. Thus, to be
consistent, the words “one city block” must also be a measure of distance.
The majority
would have us divide the land surrounding a public park into rectangular blocks
bounded by city streets on all four sides and concludes that the “park zone
includes the entire area of a block that is directly adjacent to the
park.” By adopting this definition of
“city block” the majority conflates the different means by which distance and
area are measured[5]
and as a result unduly complicates the straightforward concept of distance as
articulated in the statute. Distance is
a linear measurement—the extent of the space between two objects or points—and
is typically expressed in terms such as: 10 feet wide; 5 feet, 10 inches tall;
100 yards long; or “300 feet.” Area is a
different type of measurement. It is a
measure of the surface area of something and this measurement of area is expressed
in terms distinctly different from those used for distance, i.e. square foot,
square yard, square kilometer, square mile, or square block. Because distance and area are two distinct
concepts of measurement, they should not be conflated. While measurements of distance can be used to
determine area, distance should not be equated or confused with a measurement
of area. It is at this point that the
majority and I part company.
While the term
“city block,” as indicated above, can be used to determine an area such as a
square block—or as the majority states, “a rectangular section of a city or
town bounded on each side by consecutive streets”—the term “city block” is not
used in the statute to mean area. In
contrast to the majority, I conclude that the legislature intended the term “city
block” to mean a measure of distance that equals a linear segment of a street
bounded by consecutive cross streets. Supporting
my conclusion is the observation that if the legislature wanted the statute to
define area as being bounded on each side by consecutive cross streets, it
could have used terms such as the area enclosed within the boundary of adjacent
streets, city streets, or even a square block or rectangular block. But the legislature did not do so; rather, it
gave us a measurement of distance which we are to use to determine the area in
a park zone.
Because “city
block” is a measure of distance used to determine the area of a park zone, we
must be precise in how we define where that distance begins and ends. This second question is more difficult to
answer than the first because the legislature has not provided a definition and
there are several alternatives to choose from in determining the distance. If a city block means a segment of a street
bounded by consecutive cross streets, I conclude that the best answer to this
question is that a city block starts at the middle of one of the cross streets,
and ends at the middle of the next cross street. This definition is consistent with the
general rule of law on land title descriptions and boundaries.
It is a general
rule of land title descriptions and boundaries that a municipality takes only
an easement in a public right of way and that a conveyance carries title to the
center of the right of way subject to the public easement. While this is a rule
of construction that may be rebutted by an express provision showing the right
of way was not intended to be conveyed, I conclude that it is appropriate to
apply this general rule when interpreting the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 152.01,
subd. 12a. More particularly, I refer to Joyce Palomar, Patton and Palomar on
Land Titles § 146 (3d ed. 2003), which provides that:
Whether
acquired by deed, dedication, condemnation, or prescription, the general rule
is that in acquiring public rights of way, a municipality takes an easement
only. . . . It is the general rule to
construe such conveyances to carry the title to the center of the right of way,
subject to the public easement, provided the grantor at the time owned to the
center, and no words of specific description show a contrary intent.
Our case law
likewise recognizes that “any abutting landowner owns to the middle of the
platted street or alley and that the soil and its appurtenances, within the
limits of such street or alley, belong to the owner in fee, subject only to the
right of the public to use or remove the same for the purpose of
improvement.” Kochevar v. City of Gilbert, 273 Minn. 274, 276, 141 N.W.2d 24, 26
(1966); see also Harrington v. Saint Paul
& Sioux City R.R. Co., 17 Minn. 215 (1871) (“We see no reason why the
trustee’s deed to plaintiff did not pass to her the legal title to the fee of
the land to the center of the street adjoining her lots, as in the ordinary
case of conveyance of lands adjoining a highway.”).
The definition I propose provides a precise,
unambiguous answer to the question of what is meant by the linear measurement
of a “city block” in the statute.
Moreover, this definition eliminates the possibility of any gaps within
the area comprising the park zone and provides a context to answer questions we
may face when applying the statute in the future. The attached diagram illustrates the
precision that follows from the use of the term “city block” as I have defined
it.
While my
interpretation and application of Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a, will have
the same end result as the majority’s interpretation, the distinction between
our respective analyses of the statute is important. This is so because the result under the two
definitions may not be the same in all instances. For example, the result may differ when
determining whether a point located on the square blocks that lie to the
northwest, northeast, southeast, and southwest of a park is within the park
zone. Under my interpretation, we
ascertain the distance of a city block, then use that distance to measure from
the edge of the park. Using this linear
measurement, we can easily ascertain the area included within the park
zone. Only the locations or places that
are within the surface area created by measuring the distance of 300 feet or
one city block, whichever distance is greater, from the edge of the park would
be within the park zone.
I find the
majority’s statement that a park zone “includes the entire area of a block that
is directly adjacent to the park” to be confusing because it unnecessarily
brings into the equation an entirely different unit of measurement, “the entire
area of a block.” Moreover, the majority
potentially answers or presumes to answer a broader question than we are asked to
address today. Under the majority’s
holding, the total area within the square blocks that lie to the northwest,
northeast, southeast, and southwest of
are “directly adjacent” to the Park and therefore under its definition must be included
within the park zone. Whether all or
part of those square blocks are in the park zone is not a question before
us. Here, I take issue with the
majority’s characterization of the concurrence as being an advisory opinion
because it answers more than the question before us. The concurrence does no such thing. I do not purport to answer any specific
question regarding the outcome of a hypothetical, I attempt only to elucidate
my interpretation of the statute and how it is to be applied, and to
demonstrate the distinction between my interpretation and that of the
majority.
While I agree
with Carufel that the words “one city block” as used in Minn. Stat. § 152.01,
subd. 12a, must be interpreted as being a unit of linear measurement, I
disagree with Carufel’s application of the statute. Carufel fails to use “city block” as a
measurement of distance to determine the area of a park zone. Once the distance of a city block is
determined, we must use that distance to delimit the park zone. Setting the boundary of the park zone is
accomplished by measuring the length of one city block outward in any direction
from any point on the park boundary. All
of the surface area between the park boundary and the outward extremity of that
measurement is in the park zone.[6]
Even though
Carufel’s house faces
it is within a park zone because it is located within the area ascertained by
measuring the length of one city block outward from the boundary of
(See attached diagram). Houses
and other points on the western side of Adams Street are within one city block
of the edge of the park and are therefore within the park zone; but houses
across the street on the eastern side of Adams Street lie beyond the park zone because
they are not within one city block of the park.
Under my interpretation, Carufel’s second-degree controlled substance
convictions are sustained because his house lies within the area created by
measuring the distance of one city block from the park boundary.
Finally, if one
were to conclude that Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a, is ambiguous—which I do
not—I believe my interpretation should still prevail over that of the majority
because the rule of lenity would then apply.
The rule of lenity states that “[w]hen the statute in question is a
criminal statute, courts should resolve ambiguity concerning the ambit of the
statute in favor of lenity.” State v. Stevenson, 656 N.W.2d 235, 238
(Minn. 2003); see also State v. Walsh,
43 Minn. 444, 445, 45 N.W. 721, 721 (1890) (“A statute is not to be deemed to
make an act criminal, which would not have been so except for the statute,
unless the intention of the legislature to effect that result is apparent, and
not seriously doubtful.”). Applying the
rule of lenity, my interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a, is more
appropriate than the majority’s interpretation because it is the more narrow
interpretation of this criminal statute.
To conclude, I
would reverse the court of appeals and reinstate Carufel’s second-degree
controlled substance convictions. But, I
would do so under an interpretation of the statute that holds one city block as
used in the statute is a linear measure of distance and that this distance is
equal to a segment of a street bounded by consecutive cross streets, a segment
which begins and ends at the middle point of each cross street.
[1]
The legislature also added
“public housing zone” to chapter 152 of the criminal code in 1991, and “drug
treatment facility” in 1997. Act of May
30, 1997, ch. 239, art. 4, §§ 2, 5, 7, 1997 Minn. Laws 2787, 2787–90 (codified
at Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 22 (2008)); Act of June 3, 1991, ch.
279, §§ 1, 4, 1991 Minn. Laws 1282, 1282–83 (codified at Minn.
Stat. § 152.01, subd. 19 (2008)).
[2]
The concurrence’s “distance
only” interpretation is flawed because it reads the word “area” out of the
statute. Specifically, a “park zone”
includes both a distance measurement of “one city block” and includes the
“area” within one city block. Minn.
Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a. See State v. Spence, 768 N.W.2d 104, 108
(
(explaining that we avoid statutory constructions that render words
superfluous). The concurrence erroneously asserts that our
analysis fails to recognize that the phrase “one city block” refers to a
distance measurement. We read the
statutory phrase “one city block” to mean both a distance measurement from the
park, and to encompass the entire area of that city block. The statutory
phrases “area within” and “whichever distance is greater” demonstrate that the
legislature contemplated concepts of both area and distance. These concepts are slightly different. Distance is a measurement of the line between
two objects. Area is a measurement of
the entire surface of an object.
Carufel’s house falls both within the distance measurement of one city
block and within the area measurement of a city block.
[3] The
concurrence’s illustration overly complicates the meaning of subdivision 12a
and loses sight of the issue before the court.
First, the concurrence adds the concept of property ownership to support
its theory that it is the centerline of a public street and not the curbline
that must be used to determine the distance of one city block from
Thus, the concurrence suggests that the “park boundary” and presumably
the alternative 300-foot measurement is the centerline of the street. The property ownership theory, however, was
not briefed, argued, or considered by the district court or court of appeals
and therefore is not before us.
Moreover, subdivision 12a does not state that legal ownership is
relevant in determining the meaning of one city block from the “park
boundary.” Such an interpretation would
require us to add words to the statute that do not exist. Further, the plain and ordinary meaning of
“park boundary” is the edge of the park, not the centerline of the street. Second, the concurrence presents a
hypothetical 8‑block area that is not before the court. In this case, the area in question is the
block containing Carufel’s residence, which is directly adjacent to the eastern
boundary of
and not a hypothetical illustration that is materially different. See State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 203
n.11 (
2002) (declining to respond to the argument of the concurrence/dissent because
it would require the court to render an advisory opinion).
[4]
As discussed above, Carufel
asserts that one city block means a three-sided perimeter measurement.
According to Carufel, neither the fourth side of the block or the area of the
block is within the meaning of one city block. The concurrence rejects
the exclusion of the fourth side of the block, but fails to address Carufel’s
argument that the area within the block is also excluded. In doing so,
the concurrence implicitly accepts Carufel’s argument that a sale in Carufel’s
backyard is excluded. Unlike Carufel and
the concurrence, we are not willing to read Minn. Stat. § 152.01,
subd. 12a, in a manner that ignores the “area within” language of the statute.
[5] I
note that the majority does recognize this difference when it says that
“[d]istance is a measurement of the line between two objects. Area is a measurement of the entire surface
of an object.”
[6] The
majority states that “the concurrence implicitly accepts Carufel’s argument
that a sale in Carufel’s backyard is excluded [from the park zone].” This is a flawed reading of my concurrence
and my response to this statement is contained in the analysis set forth
herein.